CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
A RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.©
The principles of democracy and human rights have
been persistent, if at times secondary, themes within the rhetoric of
American foreign policy toward Africa since the end of World War II.
The linking of such Wilsonian precepts with foreign policy practice,
however, has been an altogether different story. US policy makers consistently
followed the dictates of realpolitik in the era of the Cold War, leaving
concerns for democracy and human rights aside. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, conditions are now in
place for the tangible and coherent pursuit of an American foreign policy
based on democracy and human rights. In the current era, the question
emerges as to the resonance of such Wilsonian principles in US foreign
policy towards Africa. This essay examines the salience of Wilsonian
precepts in United States foreign policy towards Africa in the past
and in the current era of Clinton's visit to Africa.
In his foreign policy pronouncements vis-a-vis the
European colonial powers President Woodrow Wilson advocated for the
pursuit of democracy and human rights conceptualized within the context
of self-determination for the colonized peoples. The idea of universal
morality was central for Wilson. In his view, the realization of individual
freedom, limited government, and legitimacy of power held the key to
both international peace and the emancipation of humanity from injustice(1).
It was within this philosophical context that he advocated for the need
to make the world safe for democracy. This, he argued, would promote
America's long term interests (2).
Wilsonianism emerged as a distinct policy philosophy
at the end of the First World War. One of the central concerns at the
time was how to avoid war and conflict in general. For Wilson, the crucial
priority was the need to establish people-oriented internal and international
democratic institutions that would act as the custodians of democracy
and human rights as conceptualised within the general rubric of self-determination
(3). This idealism culminated in the formation of the League of Nations
in 1919. Thus, Wilsonianism was not only internationalised but also
institutionalised. Although the United States did not become a contracting
party to the League, Wilsonianism had a global impact.
Such thinking would go on to inform the founding
fathers of the United Nations. The UN system tangibly paved the way
for the process of decolonization in Africa through the UN General Assembly
resolutions, with African countries which were independent at the time
as well as India and the socialist countries taking the lead (4). In
this respect, Wilsonianism not only challenged dictatorial and authoritarian
systems worldwide but it also helped oppressed people become aware of
their rights. For the colonized peoples of Africa, democracy and human
rights (or self-determination in general) was equated with the absence
of colonialism (5). Moreover, the momentum on the issues of democracy
and human rights was evidenced with the appointment of Eleanor Roosevelt
to Chair a Commission on Human Rights. The results of Roosevelt's Commission
were the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and its corollaries the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
President Wilson's global campaign as the champion
for the silent majority also set the stage for a United States democracy
and human rights foreign policy in the twentieth century (6). Wilsonian
precepts resonated clearly in the messsage of the Atlantic Charter which,
although promulgated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wilson's intellectual
heir, manifestly indicated US dissatisfaction with the lack of sovereignty
for colonised peoples.
The concern for the promulgation of democracy and
human rights is thus part of the legacy of United States foreign policy
towards Africa. The salience of these moral principles in foregn policy
practice, however, has always stood in the face of a more realist agenda
guiding US policy. This was particularly evident during the Cold War.
The status of such ideas in the post-Cold War foreign policy of the
United States remains an open question.
WILSONIANISM SHELVED: THE COLD WAR AND US POLICY
In the spirit of Wilsonianism, the US welcomed decolonization
and independence in Africa in the 1960s. However, with Cold War prism
taking a centre stage, emerging American national interests became defined
in terms of combatting communism in Africa and other parts of the world.
Indeed, such concerns were evident even prior to much of Africa's independence.
After his visit to Africa, Vice-President Nixon in his report to Eisenhower
explained that "the course of Africa's development...could well
prove to be the decisive factor between the forces of freedom and international
To be sure, the concerns with democracy and human
rights occasionally surfaced in the discourse of US foreign policy.
For instance, the US Congress, particularly since the 1960s has enacted
legislation linking economic and military aid to democracy and human
rights. Section 116 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act prohibited the
President from providing development assistance "to the government
of any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights" (8). Similarly, the
1976 Congressional Foreign Assistance Act stipulates, among other things,
that the US is "to promote and encourage increased respect of human
rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world." US security
assistance was to be given in a manner which will "provide and
advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States ,
through such programs, with governments which deny their people internationally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms" (9).
These episodic legislative efforts should not blind
us to a more general pattern wherein US foreign policy actually worked
against the precepts of Wilsonianism. The overall history of US activity
in Africa during the cold war reads like a litany of anti-Wilsonian
practices justified in the name of containing communism. This included
US support of such brutal dictators as Mobutu, Moi, Barre, Nimieri,
and Selassie, whose human rights records were among the worst in Africa.
Billions of dollars were spent to roll back communism. Indeed, US weapons
played major roles in conflict situations in Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia,
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo-DRC), Namibia, Somalia,
Sudan, Uganda, and Sierra Leone.
The more specific chronology of US foreign policy
further confirms US reluctance to support Wilsonianism. President Kennedy,
guided by US strategic interests, was unable to support anti-colonial
forces in Portuguese colonies in Africa due to his concern for the strategic
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bases in the Azores (10).
Even the 1960 decolonization and self-determination-oriented UN Resolution
1541 (XV), in which Wilsonianism was clearly inscribed, was not supported
by the Eisenhower Administration. The US was one of nine countries (Australia,
Belgium, Britain, the Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa,
and Spain) to abstain during the voting in the UN General Assembly (11).
The abstention clearly indicated that the US sanctioned oppression,
racial discrimination, and the violation of human rights in Africa by
the colonial powers, if to do so meant containing communism. US ambivalence
on the Rhodesian question was also a clear manifestation of a reluctance
to pursue democracy and human rights policies in Africa (12). Although
the administrations of Presidents Kennedy (1961-1963) and Johnson (1963-1969)
were generally concerned with the issue of apartheid in South Africa,
the Vietnam war occupied most of their time.
Whereas the Johnson Administration upheld the UN
economic sanctions against the white regime in Rhodesia because of its
human rights violations, President Nixon permitted the US company Union
Carbide to import 150,000 tons of chromium ore from that country (13).
Similarly, the Nixon Administration also increased military aid to South
Africa, violating the UN embargo. This policy clearly placed the US
on the side of the white regimes in southern Africa and in support of
the violation of human rights policies that were part of the systems.
The Nixon and Ford Administrations's policies of replacing Wilsonianism
with national security only enhanced the status quo in the region. These
trends in foreign policy behavior underwent a gradual, though inconsistent,
shift during the Carter Administration (1977-1981).
Carter defeated the Vietnam War weary and Watergate
scandal plagued Republican Administration by building on a domestic
constituency rife with Cold War disillusionment (14). His new vision
de-emphasized the view that conceptualized conflicts in Africa within
the prism of communist adventurism. For Carter, conflicts arose as a
result of domestic disorder or simply socio-economic and political stress
(15). Carter, like Wilson, brought to the White House religious and
moral virtues which translated into his foreign policy-making process
(16). One of his concerns was how to bring about democracy in Africa.
To help him achieve this objective, he appointed a number of African-Americans,
in addition to others, who shared his views to key foreign policy-making
positions (17). It was during the Carter Administration that a real
qualitative leap in the prominence of American human rights foreign
policy was reactivated (18). Carter was able, at least initially, to
move America away from the realpolitik of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years
to a vision of Wilsonianism. Specifically, he made the issues of democracy
and human rights the subject of international diplomatic discourse.
This policy initiative was pursued more vigorously in his first two
years in office, raising the hopes of pro-democracy and human rights
advocates both in the US and Africa. For example, export and import
restrictions were imposed on South Africa , Ethiopia, and Uganda (19).
By linking economic and military aid to human rights violations, the
Carter Administration intended to influence the policies of the repressive
regimes in Africa.
Carter's idealism was aimed at encouraging countries
in Africa considered to be progressive. His Administration dismissed
the Kissinger plans in southern Africa as inconsistent with democracy
and human rights principles and supported instead the anti-apartheid
efforts of the Front-Line States. Carter also increased diplomatic efforts
aimed at resolving the Angolan, Mozambican, and Namibian questions.
Racism and dictatorship rather than communism were seen as the main
threat to American interests in Africa (20). The Carter Administration
also nullified the 1971 Byrd Amendment which allowed American companies
to import chrome from Rhodesia and signed U.R. 1746 to law prohibiting
US companies from dealing in trade with the white minority regimes in
southern Africa and limiting military sales restrictions on countries
in Africa that violated human rights in general.
These moves placed the Carter Administration on
the side of the pro-democracy and human rights movements in the region
and the anti-apartheid advocates in the US (21). President Carter's
shift from Wilsonian idealism to realpolitik became apparent during
the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking of American hostages
in Iran. Carter hurriedly negotiated for military bases in Kenya, Somalia,
and Sudan in 1980 at a time when human rights violations were rampant
in these countries. Carter needed logistical support for the Rapid Deployment
Force (RDF) which was established as a result of the 1979 Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and the US hostage crisis in Iran. (22). His Administration's
inconsistency, however, was displayed on a number of occasions. Whereas
he was concerned with the Soviet intention in Africa, his Administration
was also insistent on the issue of the observance of human rights (23).
In Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, for example, Zaire became one of the
first victims in Sub-Saharan Africa whose military aid was reduced by
Congress during the Carter Administration . Ethiopia and South Africa
also were earmarked for sanctions and denial of military aid.
The Reagan and Bush Administrations viewed the issue
of democracy and human rights largely within the context of the containment
of communism in Africa. This was clearly symbolized in their continued
support for what Reagan called freedom fighters such as the National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Contact Group
of Western countries established during the Carter Administration to
oversee the Namibian transition to independence was relaxed by the Reagan
Administration. Instead, Reagan established the policy of constructive
engagement which accommodated the views of the apartheid regime (24).
The US-USSR rapprochement that began in 1984 with the Reagan-Gromyko
meeting set the stage for the close of the Cold War. These developments
paved the way for the Reagan Administration's accommodative approach
to human rights that was expanded under the Bush Administration (25).
THE END OF THE COLD WAR: A NEW TREND IN US FOREIGN
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in great
opportunity for the pursuit of foreign policy based on Wilsonianism.
We find such an emphasis emerging in the foreign policy orientation
of both the Presidency and Congress. To be sure, it will take some time,
perhaps decades, before such a policy becomes meaningfully established.
Our aim here is to try to demonstrate that a trend is emerging within
the US foreign policy-making establishment in favor of the pursuit of
democracy and human rights policy in Africa. The linkage of Wilsonianism
to foreign policy and development acquired a central theme under President
Bush following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US advisor to the
UN Commission for Human Rights, Marc Northern, clearly articulated President
Bush Administration's foreign policy on democracy and human rights.
In his address to the Commission, Northern stated that "the US
makes no apology for insisting that where human rights are concerned,
every nation , including my own must be held to the highest standard...
. We stand ready to help those governments committed to human rights
move ahead" (26). He further emphasized that "the division
in the world today is not between East and West... . The real division
in the world is between those committed to democracy and liberty and
those against" (27). This trend of thinking , did not however,
manifest until in the 1990s. In 1989 the Bush Administration opposed
aids cuts to some of the leading African old guards-cum-dictators such
as Moi (Kenya), Barre (Somalia), and Mobutu (Zaire, now DRC). The same
dictators were to face political conditionalities in the 1990s imposed
by the US and other donor countries.
In Kenya, for example , relations with the US and
other donor countries in general began to deteriorate in 1989. The years
1989-1991 witnessed great internal and international pressure on the
Kenyan Government to allow multipartism. The US Ambassador to Kenya,
Smith Hemstone, brushing diplomatic ethics aside, stated publicly that
US assistance would be directed to countries that "nourished democratic
institutions, defended human rights and practised multiparty politics"
(28). In conformity with Section 116 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance
Act and other democracy and human rights legislation, President Bush
acquiesced to the Congressional freezing of $25 million in military
aid to Kenya (29). Kenya's foreign aid was subsequently withheld by
the US and other donors in 1991 forcing the Moi regime to allow multipartism.
The other African countries which were victims of Congressional legislation
in the late 1980s to early 1990s included, Cameroon, Malawi, Sudan,
Togo, and Zaire. The Bush Administration was also involved directly
or indirectly in peace initiatives in Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia,
and Zaire among others. These efforts were augmented by Congressional
The effort of Bush Administration on the issue of
human rights and democracy were carried on by President Clinton who
acknowledged that when he became President, the US had no policy towards
Africa. The policies existing at the time, he argued, focused mainly
on specific countries. He stated that "for decades we viewed Africa
through Cold War prism...We supported leaders on the basis of their
anti-Communist or anti-apartheid rhetoric perhaps more than their action
... And... the United States... simply ignored the realities of Africa"
(30). He further emphasized that the United States would like to "see
more prosperity and more well-functioning economies and democracy...We'd
like to see sustainable development that promotes the long-term interest"
defined in terms of global stability (31). This Wilsonian liberal internationalism
constituted part of Clinton's foreign policy orientation.
In one of his public speeches, the American Secretary
of State at the time, Warren Christopher, emphasized that "promoting
democracy and human rights is a pillar of American foreign policy"
conceptualized within what he called the "moral and strategic imperative
of the 1990s" (32). The concern of the Clinton Administration,
rhetoric or otherwise, on these issues is centred on the need to establish
viable internal and international stability defined in terms of democracy
and human rights. These values are increasingly being linked to foreign
aid by donors. This foreign policy framework is based on the thesis
that liberal democracy and free markets are the best guarantors of world
peace, stability and development (33). Financial institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank(WB) in particular,
have joined the bandwagon in supporting the emerging donors' perspectives
on the issues of democracy and human rights. These policies are bound
to enhance internal and international pro-democracy efforts.
A further example of Clinton's commitment to human
rights is witnessed in the Administration's response to the cancellation
of election and killings of innocent people by the Abacha regime in
Nigeria. The Clinton Administration cut off $450,000 aid for military
training and $11 million in grants. The US, the European Community,
the Commonwealth Countries, and some members of the UN also imposed
sanctions against the Abacha regime following the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa,
a human rights advocate, and eight other Ogonis (34). In her address
to the UN General Assembly on November 28, 1995, the US Ambassador to
the UN at the time now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright singled
out Nigeria and Sudan as countries in Africa whose governments are associated
with dictatorship, coercion and violation of international recognized
human rights principles (35).
However, concerns with democracy and human rights
did not supplant more fundamental American interests. The US, however,
as one of the major importers of Nigerian crude oil, did not impose
stiff economic sanctions against Nigeria. This indicates that realpolitik
still guides important aspects of US foreign policy. Indeed, this is
a clear indication that regardless of a President's avowed politics,
US economic interests always take precedence over other issues.
Moreover, stability in Africa is increasingly understood
within the context of Wilsonianism. This is evidenced by the steady
decline in military procurement to the continent, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa. For example, the US arms deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa started
to show a steady decline from 1985 to 1994. Under the Clinton Administration,
the term Security Assistance since 1994 has been changed to Assistance
for Promoting Peace and Building Democracy. This shows a clear shift
in the Administration's policy on security issues in relation to Africa.
The focus by his Administration is on the peace-building military training
in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the
individual African states. This new concept, under the name African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), introduced in 1996 by the Clinton
Administration, is designed to prepare African countries' military personnel
for future peace-keeping missions in trouble-spots in the continent.
While Botswana, Uganda, and Zimbabwe participated in this joint military
training program with the US Marines in late 1997, Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania did so in 1998. What is emerging within the US foreign policy-making
establishment is the inclusion of democracy and human rights even on
matters pertaining to security.
To augment its peace-building initiatives in Africa
the Clinton Administration has also supported the concept of denuclearization
of Africa. The US played an active role in drafting the final text of
the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty also known as the Treaty
of Pelindaba which was opened for signature in April 1996 in Cairo,
Egypt. During the Cold War the US was persistently opposed to this concept,
particularly in relation to the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace proposed
by the African and Indian Ocean littoral states.
CLINTON'S VISIT AND WILSONIANISM: RHETORIC OR REALITY?
One of the central questions which needs to be asked
is the extent to which President Clinton's March 1998 visit to Africa
helped solidify the US policy of Wilsonianism? Or was his visit influenced
largely by narrow American realpolitik perspectives thus missing the
opportunity to lay the foundation for a well established Wilsonian idealism?
While in Uganda President Clinton emphasized that
"if we work together to strengthen democracy and respect for human
rights, we can help this continent reach its full potential in the 21st
century -- its true greatness, which has too long been denied"
(36). This was the message Clinton re-emphasized during his official
tour of the continent. President Clinton also stressed a number of things,
which according to him, are different from the course US took during
the Cold War period. First, he emphasized the importance of good governance,
accountability, freely elected governments, and the need for African
governments to provide democratic space. Second, he stated that African
stability, security, and prosperity are consistent with US interests.
Third, he stressed that respect for democracy and human rights constitutes
the centre stage of US interest in Africa. Clinton's US-Africa foreign
policy pronouncements centred on trade, security, and democracy and
human rights (37). These statements were carefully chosen and linked
to Clinton's priorities and strategies at home and in Africa.
Within the domestic context it can be argued that
the Clinton Administration's main objective was designed to enlarge
its domestic constituency, particularly among African-Americans. His
recent recognition of the role played by the American slaves during
the Civil War and his apology for the US transAtlantic slave trade can
be understood in this context. An expanded domestic constituency would
enhance support for the Democratic Party in future elections. Louis
Farrakhan's visit to Africa earlier, particularly to Libya and Sudan(dubbed
terrorist nations by the US), could not be taken lightly given his increasing
influence in the US (38). Clinton also wanted to enhance his Administration's
image in Africa by engaging in a mutually beneficial human relationship
with Africans, or simply a comprehensive form of "neo-constructive
engagement". This was an important aspect of his visit. It was
an attempt to move Africa away from marginalisation and mere US stereotypes
to a continent that needs to be engaged in a reciprocal partnership.
In other words he brought America to Africa by way of focusing the attention
of Americans on the African continent. Clinton may have succeeded in
these areas at home-gaining support of the African-Americans and establishing
a different image of Africa among the American people-but what are the
potential ramifications in the African context?
With the exception of Rwanda, Clinton visited countries
(Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana and Senegal ) considered
by the Administration to be democratising and promoting market-oriented
economies. But what package did he bring? His trip was boosted, at least
by the perspectives of his Administration, with the passage of the African
Growth and Opportunity Act on March 11, 1998 by the US House of Representatives.
Yet, to some observers the Act "poses significant threats to Africa's
long term interests in sustainable economic development and democracy-building"
(39). The central displeasure with the Act is that it imposes certain
conditions- a form of "trickle down theory"- on the African
countries. For example, the African countries must comply with IMF rules
which require the privatisation of their assets through divestiture;
they must acquiesce to World Trade Organization rules such as tariff
cuts and the removal of import restrictions and adopt currencies and
investment deregulations which allow foreign investors to establish
ownership over natural resources in the continent (40). The initiative
is obviously a good one and it indicates a willingness on the part of
the Clinton Administration and Congress to engage in meaningful economic
relations with Africa. The Act in its present form, however, constitutes
a threat to the sovereignty of the African states and renders the idea
of mutual respect and reciprocal partnership entailed in some of Clinton's
Whereas Clinton emphasized that US-Africa economic
policy is to be based on trade as opposed to foreign aid, he failed
to offer a historic package to the debt plagued continent. Economic
development and more so Wilsonian idealism inscribed in his speeches
cannot thrive in a continent trapped in debt. Currently, sub-Saharan
Africa alone has foreign debts totaling over $200 billion. Clinton's
message could have had great impact for generations to come in the new
millennium if it contained a plan for writing-off the 48 sub-Saharan
African states' debts, 31 of which are classified as severely indebted
and low-income. Something of great foreign policy magnitude like the
1948 Marshall Plan could have made a difference. Even if the plan (or
let us call it Clinton-Albright African Plan) were to target only some
of the African countries perceived by the US leaders to be in the processes
of nourishing democratic ideals, good governance, and respect for human
rights, it could have set the stage for a tangible and historic US-Africa
policy. The fact that the US and its allies managed to mobilize about
$100 billion debt relief under the 1996 Highly Indebted Poor Country
Initiative (HIPC) to salvage the East Asian countries trapped in economic
crisis, make Clinton's rhetoric in Africa suspect. After all, even under
the debt chocking conditions, about eleven sub-Saharan African countries
managed to experience 6% growth rates in the period 1996-97, faster
than their 3% population growth rates. It is along these lines that
Clinton could have made his visit more historic which in turn could
have served long term US-Africa interests. Instead, US aid to Africa
has undergone a steady decline in recent years. Whereas sub-Saharan
Africa received an average of $700 million from the US between 1990-98,
down from $ 841 million in 1992, Israel's aid increased from $3 billion
to $5.5 billion in the same period (41) What is more revealing is that
in Fiscal Year 1999, Sub-Saharan Africa is allocated only $155 million
compared to $225 million for Bosnia alone (42).
Clinton's strategic initiative in Africa conceptualised
within the context of peacekeeping missions or simply "African
solutions to African problems" sounds more like a new form of the
Nixon doctrine of the early 1970s, a policy based on the strategy of
transferring arms to regional American proxies to enhance their military
capabilities to guard US interests. If the Clinton Administration's
decision to withdraw American troops from Somalia in 1994 is anything
to go by, then the idea of introducing African peacekeeping forces (ACRI)
only re-enforces my interpretation. Compare the decision by the US to
withdraw from Somalia to its commitment in the former Yugoslavia? The
NATO peacekeeping forces are still busy patrolling the area a few years
after they were deployed. This is not to argue that the US should become
a policeman in Africa. The central point is that even in the post Cold
War era the US commitment to Africa is still questionable. It remains
at the level of rhetoric defeating the objective of promoting Wilsonian
idealism, a policy that would serve US long term interests. The same
level of political will established to combat communism in Africa and
elsewhere during the Cold War era should be directed toward "rolling
back dictatorship and oppression" from the continent and replacing
it with Wilsonian idealism. President Clinton had the best opportunity
to put such a policy in place while he was in Africa. Although his speeches
in Africa were coached in Wilsonian conceptions, they will continue
to be interpreted as mere political rhetoric. An inclusive and tangible
US-Africa foreign policy orientation can still be put in place by the
Administration before the new millennium. After all this was the central
thrust of Clinton's keynote address at the White House Conference on
Africa in June 1994. In my view, such a policy, would catalyse and solidify
the political and institutional reforms that are dubbed "the African
Renaissance"sweeping across the continent.
1. See generally, Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis
of Liberal Internationalism", Foreign
Affairs, 98(Spring 1995):159-177. Wilsonianism is
hereinafter used interchangeably with democracy and human rights
2. Tony Smith, "Making the World Safe for Democracy",
The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1993), pp. 198-199. See also Anthony
Whelman, "Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement",
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43(1) (January 1994): 99-115.
3. See, Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic
Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), James L. Ray, Democracy
and International Conflict: An Evolution of the Democratic Peace Proposition
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), and Bruce M. Russett,
Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
4. See generally, United Nations, Declaration on
the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples (Doc.
A/L/ 325, 1960), Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with
Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
of Colonial Countries and Peoples (Doc. A/5800/Rev. 1,1964), Robert
Mc Coroudale, "Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach",
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43(4) (October 1994): 857-885,
and Korwa G. Adar, "The Principles of Self-Determination and Territorial
Integrity Make Strange Litigants in International Relations: A Recapitulation",
Indian Journal of International Law 26(3/4)(July-December 1986): 425-447.
5. Michla Pomerance, "The United States and
Self-Determination:Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception", American
Journal of International Law 70(1)(January 1976), p.19.
6. On the evolution of the US human rights foreign
policy see for example, David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and the United
States Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainsville:University
of Florida Press, 1988), David L. Cingranelli, Ethics, American Foreign
Policy, and the Third World (New York:St. Martins, 1993) and Joshua
Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human
Rights Policy (Lanham:Hamilton Press, 1986).
7. US Government, The Vice-President's Report to
the President on His Trip to Africa, February 28-March 21 1957, White
House Office Files, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, 1957.
8. Stephen B. Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security
Assistance on Human Rights Practices" American Journal of International
Law 76(1982)p.247. See also generally,
R. Weissbrodt, "Human Rights Legislation and
U.S. Foreign Policy", Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law 231 (1977):247-268.
9. Quoted in W.F. Buckley, "Human Rights and
Foreign Policy: A Proposal "Foreign Affairs (Spring 1980), pp.
10. Todd J. Moss, "U.S. Policy and Democratization
of Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism), Journal of Modern African
Studies 33(2) (1995), p.193.
11. Marion Muchkat, "The Process of African
Decolonization", Indian Journal of International Law 6(1966) p.495
and D. A. Kay, "The Unites Nations and Decolonization", in
James Barros, (ed.), The United Nations: Past, Present and Future (New
York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 152-153.
12. See generally, Anthony Lake, The Tar Baby'
Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1973), Mohamed A. El- Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.),
The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum
39 (Westport, CON.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1976) , Z. Brezinski, Power
and Principle:Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New
York: Farrar Straws Ginoux, 1983) and Peter J. Schraeder, United States
Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994).
13. P. M. Kamath, "Human Rights and National
Security: US Experience in Africa During the Cold War Era", in
M. Munene,J. D. Olewe-Nyunya, and K. G. Adar (eds.),The United States
and Africa: From Independence to the End of the Cold War (Nairobi: East
African Educational Publishers, 1995) p.57 and T. Szulc, The Illusion
of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York:The Viking Press,
1978), especially pp. 176- 177.
14. G. Macharia Munene, "Cold War Disillusionment
and Africa", in Munene, Nyunya, and Adar, (eds.), The United States
and Africa, op. cit., p.30
15. On this view as it relates to Africa in general
see, Helen Kitchen, US Interests in Africa (Washington, DC.: Praeger,
1983), pp.1-14 and Korwa G. Adar, "Kenya-US Relations: A Recapitulation
of the Patterns of Paradigmatic Conceptualization, 1960s- 1990s",
in Munene, Nyunya, and Adar, (eds.), The United States and Africa, op.
cit., pp. 89-104.
16. David Mervin, Ronald Reagan and the American
Presidency (New York: Longman, 1990), pp.63-64.
17. Michael Clough, Free at Last? US Policy Toward
Africa and the End of the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations
Press, 1992), p.42.
18. Dilys M. Hill, "Human Rights and Foreign
Policy", in Hill, (ed.), Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Principles
and Practice (London: Macmillan Press, 1989),p. 22.
19. For the Ugandan and the South African case see,
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, PL 95-426 and
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1978, PL 95-630 respectively. Further
restrictions were imposed on Uganda under the International Security
and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 PL 96-633.
20. Cyrus Vance, "Human Rights and Foreign
Policy", Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law Quarterly
7(1977), pp. 223-225. See also David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The
Foreign Policy of Human Rights:Rhetoric and Reality: From Jimmy Carter
to Ronald Reagan", Human Rights Quarterly 7(May 1985): 54-81. Cyrus
Vance,Hard Choices: Critical Years in American Foreign Policy (New York:
Praeger, 1983), pp.450-451.
21. W. F. Buckley, "Rhodesia and the Hypocrites",
The Washington Star, March 16, 1979 and D. Clark, "Africa's Policy's
Big Test", The New York Times, January 30, 1979.
22. Korwa G. Adar, Kenyan Foreign Policy Behavior
Towards Somalia, 1963-1983 (Lanham:University Press of America, 1994),
23. R. Cohen, "Human Rights and Decision Making
in the Executive Branch: Some Proposals for a Coordinated Strategy",
in D. P. Kommers and G. D. Loescher (eds.), Human Rights and American
Foreign Policy (Notre Dame:Notre Dame Press, 1979):216-246 and Morgan,
"Panel Rebuffs U.S. Bid to Relax a Rights Sanction", Washington
Post (March 23, 1979), p.A2, col.3. For the US sanctions against Sudan
for what Washington calls state sponsored terrorism see Korwa G. Adar,
" A State Under Siege: The Internationalization of the Sudanese
Civil War", African Security Review, 7(1)(1998):44-53.
24. US Government, The United States and South Africa:
United States Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-1985 (Washington,DC.:United
States Department of State , September, 1985).
25. Tamar Jacoby, "The Reagan Turnaround on
Human Rights", Foreign Affairs 64(Summer 1986): 1066-1086.
26. "Fledgling Democracies Can Count on U.S.
Help, Maoni Ya America, 53 (April 1992), p.1.
27. Ibid., p.1.
28. "Storm Over USA's Views "The Weekly
Review, May 11, 1990, p.14. See also, "U.S. Envoy Steps into Political
Firestorm in Kenya", New York Times, May 6, 1990, p.13 and generally,
Smith Hempstone, Rogue Ambassador: An African Memoir (Sewanee, TN.:University
of the South Press, 1997).
29. Barbara Grosh and Stephen Orvis, Political Conditionality
,Democratization and Economic Performance in Africa: Aid in Kenya in
the Post Cold War Era, no. Publisher, no date., p.6. See also, Senator
T. Kennedy, "Suspend All American Aid to Kenya for Human Rights
Violations", Congressional Record 136 (93) (July 19, 1990), pp.
30. Bill Clinton, "Developing a New U.S. Policy
Towards Africa", The White House Conference on Africa, June 26-27,
1994 (Washington, D.C.: Africa Regional Services, USIS July 1994), p.14.
32. Warren Christopher, "A New Relationship",
Africa Report (July-August 1993), p.37. Warren Christopher, "Democracy
and Human Rights: Where America Stands" Address at the World Conference
on Human Rights , Vienna, June 14, 1993.
33. "U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan
Africa" (Washington, D.C.: State Department Fact Sheet, January
27, 1993) p.6. See also, Marlin Fitzwater, "U.S. Policy for New
Era in Sub-Saharan Africa" U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4(3)
(January 18, 1993), p.35 and George Moose, "Top U.S. Official Defends
Africa Programs Before Congress, Maoni Ya America 86 (April 1995), pp.3-9.
34. For Nigeria's human rights record see, U.S.
Government, Department of State, Nigeria: Human Rights Report, 1995
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp.1-26.
35. Madeleine Albright, "U.S. Challenge Nations
on Lack of Respect for Human Rights", Moani Ya Amerika, 95 (January
36. See, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Kampala, Uganda, "Remarks by the President at Entebbe Summit for
Peace and Prosperity", Imperial Botanical Beach Hotel, Entebbe,
Uganda, March 25, 1998., pp.1-2.
37. See generally, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, "Remarks by President to the People of Ghana",
Accra, Ghana, March 23, 1998, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Press Conference by President Clinton and President Mandela", Garden
of Tuynhius, Cape Town, South Africa, March 27, 1998 and The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at Entebbe
Summit for the Peace and Prosperity", Imperial Botanical Beach
Hotel, Entebbe, Uganda, March 25, 1998.
38. "Clinton in Africa", The Economist,
March 21, 1998, p. 56.
39. "African Americans Urge Senate to Modify
Africa Trade Bill", Letter from Several Prominent African Americans
to Members of the US Senate Urging Modification of the US-Africa Trade
Bill, Transafrica, March 13, 1998, pp. 1-10.
40. Wafula Okumu, "Reflecting on Clinton's
Africa Safari", The Perspective, July 14, 1998, p. 4.
41. Ibid. See also generally, "Oxfarm Briefing
Statement on President Clinton's Africa Trip", Oxfarm International,
March 23, 1998, pp. 1-4; USIA, "Africa Wants Support Provided by
Trade Bill-Summers", (Washington, DC.: United States Information
Agency, June 22, 1998), pp.1-9.
42. "Clinton Trip Doesn't Mean Change in Policies",
The Times of Zambia, March 27, 1998, p. 1.